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INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Legislature enacted the Public Employment Labor
Relations Act' (PELRA) in 1971.2 PELRA was amended in 1973 to
grant certified bargaining unit representatives 3 power to assess fees
1. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.61-.77 (1982).
2. See Act of August 31, 1971, ch. 33, § 1, 1971 Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 2710. The
legislature indicated its purpose for enacting PELRA in section 179.61 of the Act which
provides that:
It is the public policy of this state and the purpose of sections 179.61-179.77 to
promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and
their employees, subject however, to the paramount right of the citizens of this
state to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, education, safety and welfare.
The relationships between the public, the public employees, and their employer governing bodies imply degrees of responsibility to the people served,
need of cooperation and employment protection which are different from employment in the private sector. So also the essentiality and public desire for some
public services tend to create imbalances in relative bargaining power or the
resolution with which either party to a disagreement presses its position, so that
unique approaches to negotiations and resolutions of disputes between public
employees and employers are necessary.
MINN. STAT. § 179.61 (1982).
3. In 1973, a public sector bargaining unit representative became certified by complying with the provisions of Minnesota Statutes section 179.67. If the organization represented over fifty percent of the employees in a unit and the organization so requested, it
could become the exclusive representative for the unit. Otherwise, a representative stating
that the organization represented at least thirty percent of the employees of the proposed
unit could petition for a certification election. Upon receiving a majority of the votes cast
in a certification election, the representative was certified as the exclusive representative of
that unit. Once certified, the representative could become the exclusive representative of
the bargaining unit. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 635, §§ 18-20, 1973 Minn. Laws 1526, 1531
(codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 179.67, subds. 7, 11, 12 (1982)). The present provisions re-
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against nonunion bargaining unit members.4 Certified bargaining unit
representatives still possess this assessment power. 5 Nonunion bargaining
unit members can be required to support a union financially whether
they favor or oppose unionism within their bargaining unit.6 Mandatory
union support, regardless of union membership, is typically called a
7
union security agreement.
Arguably, Minnesota's position on fee requirements for nonunion bargaining unit members in public employment is unfair to the nonunion
members. 8 The standards for mandatory nonmember fee use by public
sector unions as set forth in statutory and case law are ambiguous and
vulnerable to union exploitation.9 The constitutionality of the fee use
provision in PELRA is also suspect.1o The following is a discussion of
why the PELRA nonunion member fee provisions are unfair', and an
2
examination of the Minnesota Supreme Court's treatment of the issue.'
garding exclusive representation of a bargaining unit are essentially unchanged. See
MINN. STAT. § 179.67 (1982).
4. In 1973, Minnesota Statutes section 179.65, subdivision 2 provided that "all public employees who are not members of the exclusive representative may be required by
said representative to contribute a fair share fee for services rendered by the exclusive
representative ....
" Id
5. See id. § 179.65, subd. 2.
6. See id But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.13A-5.3 (West Supp. 1983) ("public employees shall have, and shall be protected in the exercise of, the right, freely and without fear of
penalty or reprisal, to form, join and assist any employee organization or to refainfrom any
such activity .
) (emphasis added).
7. Five basic types of union security agreements are legally recognized: the union
shop, which requires that an employee, as a condition of employment, join the union after
a stipulated time period; the maintenance of membership, which provides that once an employee joins a union, membership must continue as a condition of employment; the agency
shop, which requires that nonunion bargaining unit employees pay the equivalent of
union fees, but may retain nonmember status; thefairshare or sericefee, which requires that
nonunion employees pay a pro rata share of collective bargaining costs, but not the costs
of union only benefits; and the dues checkoff, which allows an employee to discharge union
obligations by authorizing the employer to deduct a fee from the employee's wages and
remit it directly to the union. See H. EDWARDS, R. CLARK & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 443-44 (1979) [hereinafter cited as H. EDWARDS]; T.
HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS, A LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS 4-5 (1977) (definitions of union security agreements);
see also H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CrrIES 93 n.49 (1971)

(brief discussion of agency shop);

LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

146

(A. Knapp ed. 1977) (degrees of union security). For a union perspective on public sector
union security agreements, see Zwerdling, The Liberationof Pubhc Employees.- Union Security in
the Public Sector, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 993 (1976).
8. For a discussion of the Minnesota position, see infra notes 83-127 and accompanying text.
9. See inra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
11. See in~fa notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 83-127 and accompanying text.
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The United States Supreme Court's position is set forth, as well as
other jurisdictions' treatment of the issue.14 These positions are compared with Minnesota's stance. Finally, suggestions are offered to improve the situation in Minnesota and to reduce the unfairness
experienced by Minnesota nonunion public employees.

II.

BACKGROUND

By law, a certified union is permitted to act as the exclusive representative for all employees within a particular bargaining unit.15 As the
exclusive representative, the certified union must represent all bargaining unit employees in the negotiation and administration of the collective bargaining agreement.' 6 Benefits obtained by the representative
through collective bargaining extend to all members of the bargaining
7
unit, whether or not they are members of the union.'
Since every bargaining unit member may share in union gains, union
members often fear that nonmembers may be receiving benefits at the
union's expense.' 8 Bargaining unit representatives are financed in their
13. See infra notes 30-82 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
15. See MINN. STAT. § 179.67, subd. 2 (1982). The Taft-Hartley Act states that
"[r]epresentatives designated by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives for all the employees in such unit
29.. U.S.C. § 159(l)(a) (1976). In Minnesota, a legally certified public sector repre.
sentative is the exclusive representative for the bargaining unit. For a discussion of the
merits of exclusive representation, see Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation,and the
Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897
(1975). Schatzki points out that under exclusive representation a nonunion employee is
forced to use a representative not of his own choosing to settle an individual grievance or
complaint. "Indeed the representative may be antagonistic to the employee, either personally or ideologically. Nevertheless, the law tells us that these individuals must be represented by such unsympathetic institutions." Id. at 904. Schatzki also argues that an
employee who selects a union will be more active in union affairs and subsequently the
representative will be more sensitive and aware of the employees' needs. Id at 921-22.
Schatzki concludes by advocating the abolition of exclusivity, and proposes that an employee should be allowed to select among representatives and not have the majority determine the exclusive agent. Id at 920-22.
16. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944) (private sector);
Turnstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 211 (1944)
(private sector); Kaufman v. Goldberg, 75 L.R.R.M. 2903, 2907-08 (1975) (public sector).
17. See Sullivan, Freedom of Association and the Publi Sector Agency Shop. Ball v. Detroit
and Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 85 DICK. L. REv. 21, 22 (1980).
18. This is the free rider argument. For a summary of the basic arguments on both
sides of the issue of union security, see T. HAGGARD, supra note 7, at 271-94. Union proponents argue that union security agreements eliminate the free rider, apply democratic
principles, insure that a union's exclusive status is not undermined by employers, promote
responsible leadership, and enhance the strength of unions to benefit employees. Union
opponents argue that union security agreements burden an individual's liberty to work
and violate his rights of association, speech, and religion. Opponents further argue that:
an employee represented against his will has no obligation to support a union for alleged
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collective bargaining activities through union membership dues and fees.
Union advocates argue that nonunion members of a bargaining unit,
who would otherwise receive free benefits at union members' expense,
should be required to contribute to the cost of collective bargaining.19
Without the financial support from every employee in a bargaining unit,
the representative may be unable to pursue meaningful collective bargaining. 20 Hence, a financially troubled and dissatisfied union may be
forced to resort to more drastic, perhaps even violent, means to achieve
2
its objectives. 1
Anti-union forces, on the other hand, argue that an employee has a
right to work without being forced to join a union and support its ideological views or accept the benefits it may achieve.22 Union opposition
argues that forced union support abridges fundamental rights, 23 such as
the freedoms of association, religion, and speech.24
Typically, unions deal with the problem of lack of support by negotiatbenefits on his behalf; security agreements give unions too much power; and because
union members cannot be discriminated against by law, nonmember discrimination
should likewise be prohibited. See id; see also LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR, supra note 7, at 145-72 (pros and cons of union security in public sector).
19. The United States Supreme Court has upheld the use of fee collecting from all
who receive the benefit of collective bargaining. See, e.g., Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l v. Union Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 416 (1976) (union security agreement
may provide that no employee receives benefits without paying for them); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1963) (employees sharing union benefits must
pay); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768 (1961) (dissenting
employee must pay for grievance adjustment and contract negotiations but not political
activities of union). The Court has indicated that the rights of public sector nonunion
bargaining unit members regarding union security are the same as in the private sector.
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977).
20. See Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers Local 872, 307
Minn. 96, 105, 239 N.W.2d 437, 443 (1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Thelkeld v.
Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers Local 872, 429 U.S. 880 (1976), renstaed, 316 N.W.2d 551
(Minn. 1982), appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 24 (1982). For a further discussion of Robbinsdale,
see infia notes 101-17 and accompanying text. See also Blair, Union Security Agreements in
Public Employment, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 189 (1975). Blair argues that union members
in a bargaining unit may be unable to finance adequately the negotiation and administration of a collective bargaining agreement without some monetary contribution from the
nonunion agents. The resulting financial instability of the duly-elected bargaining agent
may jeopardize meaningful collective bargaining. The union may be encouraged to assume an unnecessarily militant attitude toward management in an effort to rally more
employees to its financial support. Id at 189.
21. See Blair, supra note 20.
22. See T. HAGGARD, supra note 7, at 278; see also H. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 453.
Forced support in public employment "has the potential of becoming a neat mutual backscratching mechanism, whereby public employee representatives and politicians each reinforce the other's interests..." and individual employees and citizens have little control
over the entrenched representatives and government officials. Id
23. See T. HAGGARD, supra note 7, at 278-79.
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ing union security agreements. 2 5 These agreements can require that all
employees in the bargaining unit join the union and pay full dues and
fees, 26 or they may only require that employees pay fees with union
membership being optional.27 In Minnesota, PELRA limits public sector union security agreements to fee requirements.28 An employee cannot be forced to join a public sector union in Minnesota.29
III.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT POSITION

An examination of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of
the issue of public sector union security provides a better understanding
of the problems with the Minnesota position.30 The United States
Supreme Court set forth its position on public sector union security in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 31 In Abood, the Court upheld a clause
25. For definitions of the basic types of union security agreements, see supra note 7.
26. This is the union shop security agreement. Set supra note 7.
27. Such requirements are embodied in the agency shop and fair share or service fee
agreements. See id
28. See MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982). "Public employees shall have the right
to form and join labor or employee organizations, and shall have the right not to form and
join such organizations. . . . All public employees who are not members of the exclusive
representative may be required by said representative to contribute a fair share fee .
Id
29. "Public employees shall have the right ...
not to form and join [labor or employee] organizations." Id
30. Due to the restrictive and coercive nature of union security agreements, constitutional issues often arise. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113
(1963) (private sector nonunion employees challenged union shop fees); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (private sector employees challenged
union shop agreement); Railway Employes' v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (private sector
nonunion employees claimed union shop violated first and fifth amendments); Ellis v.
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1982) (private sector
employees challenged union shop dues); Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 501
F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974) (employee claimed mandatory dues violated freedom of religion);
Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1974)
(compulsory dues challenged as violative of first amendment); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n, 556 F. Supp. 309 (D. Mich. 1982) (public employees challenged constitutionality of
agency shop clause); Robinson v. State, 547 F. Supp. 1297 (D. NJ. 1982) (challenge to
constitutionality of act that allowed representative fees assessed against nonunion public
employees); Havas v. Communication Workers of Am., 509 F. Supp. 144 (N.D.N.Y. 1981)
(employees do not lose first amendment rights under union security agreement); Beck v.
Communication Workers of Am., 468 F. Supp. 93 (D. Md. 1979) (plaintiff claimed agency'
shop fees used for political support violated freedom of expression); Jensen v. Yonamine,
437 F. Supp. 368 (D. Hawaii 1977) (public employees challenged constitutionality of
agency shop clause).
31. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). For further discussion of Abood, see Levinson, After Abood.
Public Sector Union Secunty And The Protection Of IndividualPublic Employee Rights, 27 AM. U.L.
REV. 1 (1977); Pulliam, Union Security Clauses in Public Sector Labor Contracts and Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education: A Dissent, 31 LAB. L.J. 539 (1980); Reilly, The Constitutionality
of Labor Unons' Collection and Use of ForcedDuesfor Non-BargainingPurposes, 32 MERCER L.
REV. 561 (1981); and Sullivan, supra note 13.
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in a security agreement that required payment of a fee by all members of
a bargaining unit.32
The Abood case involved an agency shop agreement 33 whereby every
employee in the bargaining unit, even though not a union member, had
to pay a fee equal to regular union member dues. 34 State laws authorized such agreements. 35 Nonunion employees in the bargaining unit
challenged the assessment as a violation of their first and fourteenth
amendment rights of freedom of expression and association. 36 The Court
upheld the fee assessment, but stated that nonmember fees could only be
used for collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment by the union. 37 The Court held that use of nonmember fees
for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining was unconstitutional.38
The Court relied on past decisions in private sector cases for its result
in Abood 39 The Court first examined Railway Employes' v. Hanson. 40 In
Hanson, private sector employees sought to enjoin the enforcement of a
union shop agreement 4' which required periodic dues and assessments
from. all employees.4 2 The Court held that "the requirement for
financial support of the collective bargaining agency by all who receive
the benefits . . . does not violate either [the] First or the
Amendments."43

Fifth

The Hanson Court considered whether a bargaining unit member
32. 431 U.S. at 209. In Abood, the plaintiffs were Detroit teachers. They sought a
declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of an agency shop provision in Michigan's
statutes. See in~fa note 35. The teachers also challenged the validity of the collective bargaining agreement between the Detroit Board of Education and the representative teachers' federation.
33. For a definition of an agency shop agreement, see supra note 7.
34. 431 U.S. at 211.
35. See MIcH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 423.210(l)(c) (1982).
[N]othing in this act or in any law of this state shall preclude a public employer
from making an agreement with an exclusive bargaining representative . . .to
require as a condition of employment that all employees in the bargaining unit
pay to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee equivalent to the
amount of dues uniformly required of members of the exclusive bargaining representative ....
Id.
36. See 431 U.S. at 213.
37. See id at 232.
38. See id at 234-36.
39. The two private sector cases relied on most by the Court were International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), and Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351
U.S. 225 (1956).
40. 351 U.S. 225 (1956). The action in Hanson arose in Nebraska. Employees of the
Union Pacific Railroad claimed that a union shop agreement violated the state's right to
work statute. The statute provided that no person could be denied employment for membership or nonmembership in a labor organization. See id.at 228.
41. For a definition of a union shop agreement, see supra note 7.
42. 351 U.S. at 227.
43. Id at 238.
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could be forced to pay dues to a union representative. 44 The Court held
in the affirmative, but was troubled by the unspecified use of the fees in"
question. 45 In dictum, the Court indicated that using fees to advance
union ideology unrelated to collective bargaining would present a different issue.4 6 Nonetheless, the Court refused to express an opinion on the
47
issue because the record did not contain any allegations of such fee use.
The second major private sector case relied on by the Abood Court was
InternationalAssociation of Machnt'sts v. Street. 48 Street provided the Court
with an opportunity to resolve the issue of whether a union could use
dissenting employees' fees for ideological purposes unrelated to collective
bargaining. 49 The Court held that fees paid by dissenting union employees must be limited to "defray[ing] the expenses of the negotiation or
administration of collective agreements, or the expenses entailed in the
adjustment of grievances and disputes."50 The Court stated further that
using fees "to support candidates for public office, and advance political
programs, is not a use which helps defray" collective bargaining expenses. 5 l Thus, the issue which was raised but left unanswered in Hanson
was resolved. 52 The Street Court also indicated that a dissenting em53
ployee should not have to trace his fee to determine its use.
Two possible administrative remedies for reconciling the conflict over
fee use for political expression were suggested in Street. 54 The first was an
injunction against using a portion of an employee's fee for political
causes opposed by the employee. 55 The second remedy required restitution of the objecting employee's fee used by the union for political pur44. Id at 227. The union sought to compel support under section 2 Eleventh of the
Railway Labor Act which provided that carriers and a labor organization could agree
that all employees join the union and be required to tender periodic dues and fees. See 45
U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1976) (current version). The Hanson Court determined that the
Act authorized "the payment of 'periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments,' " but did
not authorize "fines and penalties." 351 U.S. at 235.
45. See 351 U.S. at 235-37. The Court stated that if fees were "imposed for purposes
not germane to collective bargaining, a different problem would be presented." Id at 235.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 238. The record only contained one union constitution setting forth the
union's political objectives. See also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 748 n.5 (1961).
48. 367 U.S. at 740.
49. Id at 768. In Hanson, the Court did not resolve the issue of fee use for political
purposes because the record lacked information on the extent of such fee use. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text. In contrast to the Hanson record, the record in Street
contained detailed information on the extent of the union's political expenditures. See 367
U.S. at 747-48.
50. Id. at 768.
51. Id.
52. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
53. 367 U.S. at 775.
54. Id. at 774.
55. Id
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poses. 56 The Court stated that neither remedy should require an
employee to pay more than his proportionate share of the collective bar57
gaining costs of the union.
After considering the private sector cases of Hanson and Street, 58 the
Abood Court held that fees assessed to nonunion bargaining unit members are constitutional only when used for collective bargaining, contract
administration, or grievance adjustment. 59 A union may not compel employees to subsidize ideological activity to which they object. 60 The
Court qualified its ruling on nonmember fee assessments, indicating that
they must be allocated equally to each member assessed by the bargain6
ing unit representative. '
A problem appears in the reasoning of the Abood majority. The decision is based on the assumption that the affected rights of nonunion employees are the same in both the public and private sectors. 62 Significant
differences exist; private sector unions push their interests mainly
through collective bargaining while public sector unions pursue their interests mainly through collective bargaining and politics.63 In the private sector, union representatives and management are at odds, and
disputes are settled at the bargaining table. In the public sector, employers are elected officials,64 and a union can operate on both sides of the
bargaining table.6 5 Through lobbying efforts and political support, a
56. See id at 775.
57. Id The Court was aware that a union might allocate all of a dissenter's fee to
collective bargaining costs, and then allocate a large portion of non-dissenting employees'
fees toward political causes. This allocation would have the same effect as requiring a
dissenting employee to pay for union political activity. See id
58. See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
59. 431 U.S. at 232.
60. See id at 236.
61. See id at 237 n.35. The Court noted an earlier case in which it had addressed the
issue of fee inequality. See Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963). In Schermerhom, an agency shop agreement required nonunion employees to pay service fees equal
to regular member dues. Union members often direct the union to use regular dues for
non-collective bargaining purposes. If nonmember fees are allocated exclusively for collective bargaining expenses, nonmembers pay more than their pro rata share. "By paying a
larger share of collective bargaining costs the nonmember subsidizes the unions' [noncollective bargaining] activities." Id at 754.
62. See 431 U.S. at 232.
63. See H. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 34-39. The Abood majority also recognized the
difference between public and private sector bargaining. See 431 U.S. at 227 n.24 (lists
sources distinguishing public and private sector bargaining).
64. The fact that public employers are government officials was noted by the Abood
majority. See 431 U.S. at 228. This is also recognized in PELRA. See MINN. STAT.
§ 179.63, subd. 4 (1982) ("Public employer means.., the state of Minnesota. . . and the
governing body of a political subdivision. .. .
65. See H. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 450. "[S]trong public sector unions have . . .
elected school board members whose first loyalty is to the union rather than to the school
board, thereby undermining if not destroying the school board's ability to negotiate effectively." Id In addition, strong public sector unions can bend the collective bargaining
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public sector union can influence management decisions and even affect
management's constitution.
When a public sector union seeks to improve conditions within a bargaining unit, it often does so by promoting favorable legislative policy
toward that unit. Such actions are at the heart of collective bargaining
in the public sector union and have prompted one commentator to compare public sector unions with political entities.66 Justice Rehnquist,
concurring in Abood, stated that he was "unable to see a constitutional
distinction between a governmentally imposed requirement that a public
employee be a Democrat or Republican or else lose his job, and a similar
requirement that a public employee contribute to the collective-bargaining expenses of a labor union."67 Justice Powell, also concurring, indicated that in several respects "the public sector union is indistinguishable
from the traditional political party in this country."68 Thus, when an
employee is compelled to contribute to the collective bargaining efforts of
a public sector union, the contribution effectively becomes a compelled
political donation. Forced political support is a first amendment viola69
tion of an individual's freedom of speech.
The majority in Abood indicated that a dissatisfied employee should
raise an objection to fee use. 70 The objection need not be specific.71 The
burden is then on the union to justify the assessed amounts. 72 The Court
process in their favor by applying political pressure through laws affecting their bargaining units. Affected laws include minimum pay increases and mandatory benefit levels. Id.
66. See Summers, Public Sector Bargaining. arobler of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U.
CIN. L. REV. 669, 672 (1975). In comparing public sector unions with political entities,
Summers points out that in public employment the employer is the government and the
collective bargaining process is a political process. See id at 670. Union representatives

bring policies to the bargaining table which, if accepted, will become governmental policies. See id

Decisions reached at the bargaining table are political decisions. See id at

672.
Summers is unsure of the effect public sector unions have on political decisions. Public sector unions have better access to the political process and are more dedicated to their
interests. The public sector union, however, is greatly outnumbered by the voting public.

See id at 673.
67. 431 U.S. at 243-44.
68. Id at 257.
69. See id at 234-35.
70. See id at 238. The Abood Court followed the reasoning of the Street Court which
held that "dissent is not to be presumed." 367 U.S. at 774. An employee must affirmatively notify a union of objections to fee use before being entitled to relief. See id
71. See 431 U.S. at 241. The Court was following the holding in Railroad Clerks v.
Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963). The Allen Court held "[i]t would be impracticable to require a
dissenting employee to allege and prove each distinct union political expenditure to which
he objects; it is enough that he manifests his opposition .... ." Id. at 118. "Since the
unions possess the facts and records from which the proportion of political to total union
expenditures can reasonably be calculated, basic considerations of fairness compel that
they, not the individual employees, bear the burden of proving such a proposition." Id at
122.
72. See supra note 71.
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acknowledged that "[tjhere will . . .be difficult problems in drawing
lines between collective-bargaining activities .. .and ideological activities . . . -73 Significantly, an employee will not receive relief unless he
first initiates proceedings against the representative.
Justice Powell disagreed with the majority's remedy. 74 Powell would
place the burden of proving the legitimacy of the fees, before they were
assessed, on the state that initially negotiated and enforced the assessment.7 5 Powell suggested that each expenditure supported by nonunion
employees meet an "overriding governmental objective" test. 76 Powell
would have the state come forward and demonstrate that each expendi77
ture served an overriding governmental objective.
Under Powell's remedy, fee use would be prejudged according to constitutional fairness. In contrast, the remedy of the Abood majority requires a public employee to pay fees despite possible unfairness, with a
fee legitimacy determination possible only after the burdened employee
raises the issue of unfairness.78 Thus, a nonunion employee's fees can be
used for political purposes under the guise of collective bargaining if no
objection is raised. Powell's remedy would prevent any fee abuse, as
nonunion employee fee use would be monitored from the start. Consequently, Powell's remedy is fairer to nonunion employees than the solution offered by the Abood majority.
Thus far, the United States Supreme Court's decisions in this area
have addressed only the issue of nonunion employee fee use. The Court
reserved regulation of union security agreements for the state legislatures. 79 Furthermore, "agreements requiring membership in a labor organization" are specifically excluded from the National Labor Relations
Act 80 (NLRA). Thus, the NLRA leaves open the opportunity for states
to fashion right-to-work laws permitting or denying the formation of
union security agreements.a1 The Act applies only to private sector unions and thus "leaves regulation of the labor relations of state and local
governments to the states."82
73. 431 U.S. at 236.
74. See id.at 255 (Powell, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
joined in Justice Powell's concurrence. See id
75. See id at 264.
76. See id.
77. See id
78. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
79. See 431 U.S. at 223. "The National Labor Relations Act leaves regulation of the
labor relations of state and local governments to the states." Id.;see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)

(1976).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976).
81. See supra note 79; see also Associated Gen. Contractors v. Otter Tail Power, 457 F.
Supp. 1207, 1217 (D.N.D. 1978) ("states may forbid the union shop and the agency shop,
and they may enforce the prohibition").
82. 431 U.S. at 223.
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IV.

THE MINNESOTA POSITION

The 1971 Minnesota Legislature sought to regulate public sector labor
relations with the enactment of PELRA.83 The Act allows an exclusive
representative 84 to require all nonmember employees in a bargaining
unit to contribute a fair share fee. 85 The amount of the fee may be equal
to regular membership fees, less the cost of benefits available only to
union members. 86 The fee may not exceed eighty-five percent of regular
membership fees.87 Notice of the assessment must be provided to the
employee,88 and the assessment may be challenged. 89 PELRA has not
been accepted without controversy, however, and the Minnesota
Supreme Court has reviewed the constitutionality of the fee assessment
provisions. 9o
In the 1976 case of Beckman v. St. Louis County Board of Commzsstoners, 91
the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of union
fees assessed against nonunion public employees. In Beckman, nonunion
county employees of a certified bargaining unit sought to enjoin a fee
deduction from their paychecks. 92 The fee was deducted by the plaintiffs' employer pursuant to an agreement negotiated with the union representative.93 The defendant union used the fees for conducting
negotiations and grievance procedures. 94 The petitioning county employees had never authorized the fee deduction. 95 Based on the lack of
employee authorization, the court held that the fees were illegal as an
unfair labor practice.96
83. The legislative purpose of PELRA is set forth supra note 2.
84. For a discussion of exclusive representation in Minnesota public employment,
see supra note 2. See also Schatzki, supra note 15 (discussion of merits of exclusive
representation).
85. See MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982). "All public employees who are not
members of the exclusive representative may be required by said representative to contribute a fair share fee .... " Id.
86. See id The fee may be "an amount equal to the regular membership dues of the
exclusive representative, less the cost of benefits financed through the dues and available
only to members of the exclusive representative .
Id.
87. See id § 179.65(2).
88. See id. The notice must be written and distributed thirty days before the assessment begins to be deducted from the employee's earnings. Id
89. Id. The employee has thirty days in which to initiate the challenge. Id
90. See infa notes 91-116 and accompanying text; see also Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3167 (D. Minn. 1982) (construing
exclusive representation and meet and confer provisions of PELRA), review granted, 104 S.
Ct. 229 (1983).
91. 308 Minn. 129, 241 N.W.2d 302 (1976).
92. The deduction was four dollars per month. Id at 130, 241 N.W.2d at 303,
93. Id. at 131, 241 N.W.2d at 304.
94. Id at 130, 241 N.W.2d at 303.
95. Id at 132, 241 N.W.2d at 304. There were ninety-seven named plaintiffs, none of
whom had authorized the monthly fee deductions. Id.
96. Id The court was "persuaded that (the fee deduction] was illegal because it de-
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Prior to the decision in Beckman, PELRA provided public employees
with "the right to request and be allowed [a] dues checkoff." 9 7 In reaching its decision, the Beckman court reasoned that "the right of every public employee to request a dues checkoff carries with it by necessary
implication the right to refuse such checkoff." 98 After the action was
commenced in Beckman, the state legislature amended PELRA.99 The
amended act provided that "[aill public employees who are not members
of the exclusive [bargaining unit] representative may be required . . . to
contribute a fair share fee for services rendered by the exclusive representative."100 Thus, nonunion bargaining unit members' implied right to
refuse a fee assessment was statutorily revoked.
The constitutionality of the amended PELRA was challenged, however, in the case of Robbinsdale Education Association v. Robbmsdale Federation
of Teachers Local 872. 10, In Robbznsdale, the defendant union representative voted to require a fair share fee from all employees within the bargaining unit.10 2 Nonunion employees in the bargaining unit objected to
the assessed fees and challenged the validity of the fee assessment provision of the Act.' 0 3 The petitioners claimed that the statute was unconstitutional because they were not given an opportunity for a hearing on
their objections to the fees.' 0 4 The trial court held that the statute vionied nonunion members their implied right not to pay employee organization dues or
" Id
fees ....
97. Minnesota Statutes section 179.65, subdivision 5 formerly provided that, "Public
employees shall have the right to request and be allowed dues check off for the employee
organization of their selection, provided that dues check off and the proceeds thereof shall
not be allowed any employee organization that has lost its right to dues check off.
Id
98. See 308 Minn. at 132, 241 N.W.2d at 305.
99. See id. at 131, 241 N.W.2d at 304.
100. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 635, § 10, 1973 Minn. Laws 1526, 1529 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982)). The 1973 amendment further provided that "the
employer upon notification by the exclusive representative of such [nonmember] employees shall be obligated to check off said fee from the earnings of the employee and transmit
the same to the exclusive representative." Id
101. 307 Minn. 96, 239 N.W.2d 437 (1976), vacatedon othergrounds sub nom., Threlkeld v.
Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers Local 872, 429 U.S. 880 (1976), re'nstated, 316 N.W.2d 551
(Minn. 1982), appeal dismissed, 103 S.Ct. 24 (1982). On first appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, Robbinsdale was vacated and remanded for consideration in light of a
1976 amendment to PELRA. The amendment provided that an employee must receive
advance written notice of the amount of the fair share fee assessment and shall be allowed
to challenge that assessment within thirty days after receipt of the notice. See Act of
March 31, 1976, ch. 102, § 2 1976 Minn. Laws 249. On rehearing, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reinstated its prior decision, reasoning that even though the Act had been
amended, it previously was constitutional on its face despite the new specificity of the 1976
amendment. See Threlkeld, 316 N.W.2d at 552.
102. See 307 Minn. at 99, 239 N.W.2d at 440. The representative required the fee
pursuant to the 1973 amendment of PELRA. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
103. 307 Minn. at 99, 239 N.W.2d at 440.
104. Id.
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lated due process, because there was no provision for notice or hearing
before the fees were determined and assessed by the representative of the
bargaining unit.105

On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statute was
constitutional. 106 The court admitted that the statute did not specifically provide for notice or a hearing prior to the assessment of the fair
share fee.' 0 7 Still, the court held the Act complied with the requisites of
due process.' 0 8 By considering the provisions that outlined procedural
remedies, the court found that PELRA provided for notice of the
amount of the fee assessment.' 0 9 The court also determined that pursuant to the Act, the assessment of the fee could be enjoined and the validity and use of the fees could be contested in court." 0
On rehearing, the Robbinsdale court stated that "the financial stability
of exclusive representatives was of such importance as to override the
need to determine the 'fair share' fee's validityprior to its imposition."'It
An employee must initiate a challenge before fee validity will be ex105. Id The Act has since been amended to specifically provide for prior notice and a
validity hearing upon a timely challenge. See Act of March 31, 1976, ch. 102, § 2, 1976
Minn. Laws 249-50 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982)).
The exclusive representative shall provide advance written notice of the amount
of the fair share fee assessment to ... all employees within the unit. A challenge
by an employee or by a person aggrieved by the assessment shall be filed in
writing with the director, the public employer, and the exclusive representative
with 30 days after receipt of the written notice.
Id
106. See 307 Minn. at 109, 239 N.W.2d at 445. Prior toRobbnsdale, in Schleck v. Freeborn County Welfare Bd., 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3525 (Minn. 1975), the county court advised that "this Court would not hesitate to hold that [MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2] is
unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions." 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3531. In Schleck, a nonunion county employee had a fair
share fee deducted from his salary that was ten cents less than regular member dues. Id at
3527. The statutory provision in question stated that "[i]n no instance shall the required
contribution exceed a pro rata share of the specific expenses incurred for services rendered
by the representative in relationship to negotiations and administration of grievance procedures." Id. The Schleck court indicated that the union failed to show that the amount
deducted from the objecting employee's salary was a pro rata share for the services of
negotiations and administration of grievance procedures, and the court ordered judgment
for the employee for the amount deducted from his salary. Id
107. See 307 Minn. at 102, 239 N.W.2d at 441. The court stated that:
PELRA should be construed to provide that the public employee has (a) the
right to notice of the amount of an impending fair share fee which is to be deducted from his earnings; (b) the right to bring an action in district court to
enjoin the use of the withheld fee; (c) the right, under certain exigent circumstances, to have the collection of the fair share fee enjoined; and (d) the right, in
all circumstances and upon proper application, to a court hearing on the validity
and proper amount of the fair share fee.
Id
108. See id
109. See id.
110. Se id
111. 316 N.W.2d 551, 552 (Minn. 1982) (emphasis in original).
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amined. This is essentially the same remedy adopted by the Abood majority.11 2 PELRA currently incorporates this view, providing for a fee
validity determination only upon a challenge by an employee. "3
In dispensing with a prior validity determination, the Robbinsdale court
reviewed past Supreme Court due process decisions requiring prior hearings. 1 4 The court concluded that "the individual property interest in
this case [Robbinsdale] is of a much lesser magnitude than was involved in
those cases, and the state's interest in the collection of the fair share fee is
clearly more substantial .... ",115 The court added that "since . . .the
individual's interest is less significant and the state's interest is more substantial, the demands of procedural due process are correspondingly reduced." t 6 Although the Abood court gave no clear indication,
apparently no prior validity determination is required, 17
The reasoning behind the Robbinsdale decision and the PELRA provision on fee assessment fails to consider the contributions of all the nonunion bargaining unit members. While an individual employee's fee might
be insignificant, when multiplied by all the nonunion employees in a
bargaining unit the significance becomes clear. "If every public employee [in the United States, union and nonunion] were under compulsion to pay union dues of $5 a month, the take would amount to $700
million a year.
... 118 A representative can demand fees from all nonunion members of a bargaining unit and, with the potential for such
funds at its disposal, become a potent political and ideological force.
PELRA's provisions should reflect the total power a representative can
derive by forcing support from nonmembers.' 19
Several other provisions of PELRA may also be questioned. The Act
provides that a fee challenge must be made within thirty days after receipt of the assessment notice.' 2 0 Such short notice is unduly harsh to
112. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
113. See MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982). The statute states in pertinent part:
The employer shall deduct the fee from the earnings of the employee and transmit the fee to the exclusive representative 30 days after the written notice was
provided, or, in the event a challenge isfiled, the deductions for a fair share fee shall
be held in escrow by the employer pending a decision ....
Id (emphasis added).
114. The cases reviewed by the Minnesota Supreme Court were Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and North Georgia
Finishing v. Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
115. 307 Minn. at 109, 239 N.W.2d at 444.
116. Id at 108-09, 239 N.W.2d at 445.
117. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
118. See H. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 451. This statistic was provided by Reed Larson
of the National Right to Work Committee, which is dedicated to promoting nonunionism.
Larson further stated that, "[it is obvious to us that union officials, with the help of some
politicians who receive campaign support from union treasuries," are seeking to lock every
public employee into paying dues into union treasuries. Id
119. See supra note 118.
120. See MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss2/3

14

19841

et al.: Union Support by Nonunion Bargaining Unit Members in Minnesota Pu
UNION SUPPORT BY NONUNION MEMBERS

new employees who feel uncomfortable or insecure in their positions during the time alloted to challenge the fee. In addition, the representative's
needs for collective bargaining funds may fluctuate.12' During periods of
stability and decreased bargaining activity, the exclusive representative
may require only a portion of the assessed amount. At such times, if the
thirty day limit for challenges has expired, collected fees could be used
for non-collective bargaining activities and the nonunion employee
would have no recourse. Beyond requiring the original notice of the fee
amount, the Act is silent regarding notice of fee use changes after the
thirty day challenge period. 122 Presumably, the internal challenge remedy will be denied after the thirty day period and the employee will be
left to seek a determination of the fee use validity through the courts.
Though PELRA requires no prior validity determination,1 23 it does
require specificity upon fee use challenge by an employee.

124

The Act

states that "[a]ll challenges shall specify those portions of the assessment
challenged and the reasons therefor .... ,,125 According to Abood, such
a requirement is unconstitutional.126 Compelling specificity violates an
27
individual's freedom to maintain his beliefs without public disclosure.1
The specificity requirement of PELRA should be deleted so that an aggrieved employee can simply object to fee use without having his convictions aired in public.
V.

TREATMENT IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The problems raised with the Minnesota position are not unique to the
state. 128 Other jurisdictions have encountered similar difficulties and
121. See Ball v. City of Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 396, 269 N.W.2d 607, 613 (1978).
For a further discussion of Ball, see infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
122. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 179.61-.76 (1982) (Public Employment Labor Relations Act).
123. Since PELRA does not provide for validity determination upon an assessment, an
employee must initiate a challenge or risk paying an unfair or invalid fee. The Abood
majority also dispensed with a prior validity determination of an assessment. See supra
notes 70-73 and accompanying text. In the interests of administrative economy, one prior
validity determination would be more efficient than many subsequent challenges.
124. See MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982). "All challenges shall specify those portions of the assessment challenged and the reasons therefor .
Id.
125. Id
126. See 431 U.S. at 241.
127. See id
128. Other states have legislated that nonunion public employees can be forced to pay
fees to a representative. Set, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-280 (West Supp. 1982);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-4 (1981 Supp.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12 (West
1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.210(1)(c) (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 28B.16.100(11) (West Supp. 1983-1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § I11.70(l)(h), (2) (West
1981).
For a brief discussion ofjudicial review of the fair share fee legislation in Michigan,
see inra notes 135-47 and accompanying text. For a brief discussion of the fair share fee
legislation in Wisconsin, see infta notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
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Minnesota can refer to them for guidance in shaping its law.
A.

The Wisconsin Approach

Wisconsin has enacted fair share fee legislation,129 and in Browne v.
Milwaukee Board of School Directors the state supreme court reviewed its
provisions.130 In Browne, the court held that the fair share legislation was
constitutional because it "forbids the use of fair share funds for purposes
unrelated to collective bargaining or contract administration." 31 The
court also stated that the "statute cannot require [nonmembers] to contribute to political purposes in violation of their first amendment
rights."132 According to the court, unfair labor practices would result if
nonunion employees were required to "pay for anything more than their
proportionate share of the cost of collective bargaining and contract
administration." 133
In Browne, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explicitly stated the types
of fee use permissible under the fair share fee assessment statute. 34 In
Minnesota, these issues have not yet been addressed and the opportunity
still exists for fee use exploitation.
B.

The Michigan Approach

The problem of fee assessment to nonunion bargaining unit members
in the public sector was also raised in Michigan.135 The Michigan
court's most significant encounter with the issue was Aboodv. DetroitBoard
129. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(l)(h), (2) (West 1982). Subsection (h) provides that
"'[flair share agreement' means an agreement between a municipal employer and a labor
organization under which all or any of the employees in the collective bargaining unit are
required to pay their proportionate share of the cost of the collective bargaining process
and contract administration ......
Id Section (2) provides that municipal employees
can join or refrain from joining collective bargaining organizations and that all employees
may be required to pay a fair share fee. Id.
130. 83 Wis. 2d 316, 265 N.W.2d 559 (1978).
131. Id at 332, 265 N.W.2d at 566.
132. Id
133. Id. at 335 n.9, 265 N.W.2d at 567 n.9.
134. The tolerated uses are collective bargaining and contract administration, and the
assessment must be proportionately equal among all bargaining unit members. See supra
notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., White Cloud Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 101 Mich. App. 309, 300
N.W.2d 551 (1980) (nonunion employee discharged for refusing to pay agency shop fee);
East Michigan Univ. v. Morgan, 100 Mich. App. 219, 298 N.W.2d 886 (1980) (fair share
fee under public sector agency shop agreement); Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Parks, 98 Mich.
App. 22, 296 N.W.2d 815 (1980) (nonunion employee dismissed for failing to pay agency
shop fees); Ball v. City of Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d 607 (1978) (nonunion
public employees challenged agency shop service fee); Smigel v. Southgate Community
School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972) (nonunion employees challenged
agency shop fee provision).
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of Education. 136 The Michigan court heeded the guidance set forth in
Abood 137 and applied it in Ball v. City of Detroit. 138 Ball involved essentially the same problem as 4bood 139 In Ball, nonunion employees challenged the amount of a fee assessed by a representative under an agency
shop agreement. 140
The Ball court applied the standard set forth in Abood and held that,
when challenged, a union must establish the cost of the three types of
permissible expenditures for nonmember fees. 14 1 For the establishment
of a prima facie case, Ball only requires "sufficient indication that a nonmember objects to the use of any portion of the service fee for purposes
unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration and griev"142
The court emphasized that dissenting emance adjustment ...
ployees do not have to prove fee objections.143 The court also advised
that if the fee is excessive, future fees must be reduced by the percentage
unrelated to legitimate fee use, and the union must make adjustments
according to future fluctuations. 144
To protect nonmembers' first amendment rights prior to a judicial determination of the validity of a fee assessment, the Ball court required
that nonmembers pay the fees into an escrow account. 145 The court acknowledged that this remedy may be a hardship for the union, but the
hardship is outweighed by the possible violation of nonmembers' first
amendment rights. 146 After the judicial determination on the fee
amount, the union has prompt access to its entitled portion and the remaining portion can be refunded to the objecting employees.147
VI.

CHANGES NEEDED IN MINNESOTA

Minnesota can benefit from the decisions in Michigan and Wisconsin
in several ways. Both states offer reasoned judicial precedent on approaches to the issue of fair share fee assessment. Given the opportunity,
136. 60 Mich. App. 92, 230 N.W.2d 322 (1975); see supra notes 31-78 and accompanying text.
137. See 60 Mich. App. at 92, 230 N.W.2d at 322.
138. 84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d 607 (1978). For a further discussion of Ball, see
Sullivan, supra note 13.
139. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
140. See 84 Mich. App. at 387, 269 N.W.2d at 609.
141. The three types of permissible expenditures are collective bargaining, grievance
and adjustment, and contract administration. Se id. at 396, 269 N.W.2d at 613.
142. Id at 395, 269 N.W.2d at 612-13.
143. See id at 395, 269 N.W.2d at 612. The Ball court stated that "[b]ecause the union
is in possession of facts and records documenting union expenditures, basic fairness requires the union to carry the burden of proof to establish the cost of [the] legitimate uses of
an objecting nonmember's service fee." Id.
144. See id. at 396, 269 N.W.2d at 613.
145. See id
146. See id.
147. See id.
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the Minnesota Supreme Court should specify the permissible uses for fair
share fees. The court must take the initiative because, as demonstrated
in Robbinsdale, the legislature depends on the court for guidance in this
area. 48 Strong political pressures may prevent the legislature from tak149
ing the first step.
Both the Michigan and Wisconsin courts indicated that nonunion bargaining unit members can only be assessed fees for purposes unrelated to
collective bargaining.15o The Minnesota Supreme Court should follow
these precedents. Presently, PELRA provides that nonunion bargaining
unit members may be assessed fees for a representative's services.5, A
representative could interpret "services" to include political or ideological activity. Nevertheless, according to Abood, an individual cannot be
compelled to subsidize such activity.' 52 By clearly defining permissible
fee uses, the Minnesota Supreme Court can minimize the potential for
fee misuse. Minnesota could adopt the Michigan and Wisconsin approaches, strengthened further by a clear definition of permissible collective bargaining purpose.
The exclusive bargaining unit representative cannot be allowed to misuse nonmember fees. In Elh's v. Railway Clerks, t53 a California court attempted to accomplish this objective by providing a laundry list of nonpermissible uses for dissenting employees' fees. 15 4 The Michigan and
148. See 316 N.W.2d at 552 n.l.
149. See H. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 451. In a National Right to Work Committee
excerpt it is stated that there is an "inordinate influence of union political power on public
officials charged with the responsibility of setting employee policies." Id. Thus, the courts
would provide a better avenue for changing PELRA.
150. See supra notes 131-34, 141 and accompanying text.
151. See MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982). PELRA states that an exclusive representative may be designated "for the purpose of negotiating grievance procedures and the
terms and conditions of employment for such employees with the employer of such unit."
Id The language of PELRA, however, does not limit "services" of a representative to
"negotiating grievance procedures." Hence, under the heading of "services" a representative can use fees for ideological purposes.
152. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
153. 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2339, modtftid, 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2976 (S.D. Cal. 1976),
modified, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2648 (S.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd in part, 685 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir.
1982). Ellis was a private sector case in which the court held it was an unfair labor practice for a union to use dissenting employee's fees for non-collective bargaining purposes.
See 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2343. The unique aspect of Ellis arose because the court listed
fee uses that did not fall under collective bargaining purposes and thus were unfair. See id
at 2339. Some of the union activities found by the Elh court as non-collective bargaining
in nature included conducting and attending union conventions, recruiting new bargaining unit members, and supporting and opposing legislative measures and policies. See id
154. The non-collective bargaining uses listed by the Ellis court were:
(1) recreational, social, and entertainment activities not attended by management personnel;
(2) operation of death benefit program;
(3) organizing and recruiting new members for airline unit and seeking bargaining authority for (a) employees not employed by airline, (b) employees
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Wisconsin courts also mentioned permissible areas for fee use.' 55
PELRA provides simply that nonmember fees may not be used for benefits available only to members. 156 The Minnesota Supreme Court could
reduce the ambiguity in PELRA by listing constitutionally permissible
1 7
and non-permissible uses for nonmember fees. 5
A second area deserving examination is the PELRA provision on fee
validity determination.158 In Minnesota, a validity determination of a
fee assessment to a nonunion employee is made only upon a challenge by
the employee.'5 9 The Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated that a
union's interest is more compelling than an individual employee's and
that a prior fee validity determination is unnecessary. 60 In Abood, Justice Powell set forth the opposing view, indicating that a prior validity
determination is needed when individuals' first amendment rights are
threatened.' 6 ' Placing the burden of litigation on the union is the appro62
priate method of protecting public employees' first amendment rights.1
not employed in air transportation industry, and (c) employees not employed in other transportation industries;
(4) publication in which substantial coverage is devoted to general news,
recreational and social activities, political and legislative matters, and
cartoons;
(5) contributions to charities and individuals;
(6) programs to provide insurance, medical, and legal services to union members
or portions thereof, other than such programs secured for its salaried officers and
employees;
(7) conducting and attending union conventions of other organizations or
unions;
(8) defense or prosecution of litigation not having as its subject matter'negotiation or administration of collective bargaining contract or settlement or adjustment of grievances or disputes of employees represented by union; and
(9) support for or opposition to proposed, pending, or existing legislative measures and governmental executive orders, policies, or decisions.
Id at 2339.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and held that the
listed uses "are germane to the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining."
685 F.2d at 1075. This reversal, however, does not diminish the important aspect of Els.
With the reversal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated definite permissible fee
uses, thus refining, though in a broad and expansive way, the meaning of collective bargaining. Hence, the ambiguity of the term collective bargaining is decreased in that
jurisdiction.
155. In Wisconsin, fair share fees must be used for collective bargaining and grievance
adjustment. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. In Michigan, theAbood standards are followed and fair share fees must be used for collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
156. See MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982).
157. See supra notes 131-33, 141, 154 and accompanying text.
158. For a further discussion of PELRA's specificity requirement and the thirty day
period for challenges of fee validity, see supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
159. See MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982).
160. See Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n, 307 Minn. at 105, 239 N.W.2d at 443. For a further
discussion of Robbinsdale, see supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
162. See id.
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Justice Powell's remedy of prior fee validity determination deserves consideration by the Minnesota Supreme Court and the state legislature.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Minnesota, public sector nonunion employees are at the mercy of
the public sector union. An exclusive representative can demand support from nonunion bargaining unit employees. The standards for permissible uses of nonmember fees are unclear. Assessments can be
collected without question unless an aggrieved employee initiates proceedings to determine the validity of the fee assessment.
Change clearly is needed in Minnesota's statutory treatment of public
sector nonunion bargaining unit members. Forced support of the public
sector union borders on forced political support. Also, "[b]y virtue of the
coerced unanimity of the workforce, the union obtains a bargaining
power that it would not have if it merely represented a segment of the
workforce."' 163 Although nonunion employees derive benefits from union
representation, the union derives equal benefit from the employee's support. A requirement for a prior validity determination upon demand by
a union for nonmember support would decrease the potential for fee misuse. Moreover, forced support of public sector unions may violate constitutional freedoms. The burden should be on the union to justify that
support, and the types of permissible and non-permissible support should
be strictly defined.
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supra note 7, at 281.
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